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ABSTRACT
This article examines the legal framework and tools for achieving sustainable
trophy hunting in Zimbabwe. Trophy hunting is part of wildlife tourism, in
which wealthy tourists visit Zimbabwe to hunt for a unique, iconic wildlife
with desirable phenotypic characteristics at a very high cost. The trophy
hunting system was developed to achieve the tripartite objectives of conserving
wildlife; providing local communities with economic opportunities and
income; and incentivizing local communities to support environmental
conservation initiatives. This article, however, highlights the blurred lines
between the purported sustainable trophy hunting and its unsustainable
implementation which now resembles “legal poaching.” This dichotomy was
heightened by the killing of Cecil the Lion, a tourism icon in Zimbabwe when
it was not listed under the quota system for trophy hunting. The well-
intentioned legal frameworks on sustainable trophy hunting in Zimbabwe
are weakened by broad exceptions that render them toothless to achieve the
intended tripartite sustainability objectives. As demonstrated in this article,
these tripartite objectives can be fulfilled by effective enforcement mechanisms
that do not currently exist. Proposals are recommended to promote these
objectives through reformation of the existing legal frameworks. The option
to ban trophy hunting is examined through a socioeconomic analysis in
Zimbabwe to determine whether it would be possible to support a complete
ban. Zimbabwe’s current socioeconomic realities confirm that banning trophy
hunting would be unlikely as doing so would devastate the tripartite objectives.
Undertaking effective and sustainable policies is the more effective path for
Zimbabwe at this time.
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1 The New King James Version of the Holy Bible.
2 Cecil was a Southern African lion that lived in Zimbabwe’s National Park for
many years. The lion became a subject of international media attention when it
was wounded and killed on 1 July 2015 by the arrows of an American recreational
trophy hunter, Walter Palmer. This event provoked widespread global
condemnation from animal rights activists, environmental organizations and
scholars on the need for global reform and rethink of trophy hunting practices.
See BBC News, “Zimbabwe’s ‘Iconic’ Lion Cecil Killed by Hunter” (27 July 2015)
< https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33674087> accessed 28 April
2018.
3 Annecoos Wiersema, “Incomplete Bans and Uncertain Markets in Wildlife Trade”
[2016] 12 UPA Asian L Rev 65, 68 (“Yet for many of those most endangered
species, CITES creates a type of dual system referred to as an incomplete ban.”).
4 Karen Higginbottom, Wildlife Tourism: Impacts, Management and Planning
(Common Ground Publishing Pty Ltd 2004) 5 (“the concept of Triple Bottom
Line sustainability focusing on economic prosperity, environmental quality and
social justice, has become widely adopted by major business players in the private
sector and government,” hence the tripartite objectives in this article mirrors
sustainability’s triple bottom line.).
A righteous man regards the life of his animal, But the tender
mercies of the wicked are cruel.
–  Proverbs 12:10 (NKJV)1
1.  INTRODUCTION
Killing Cecil the Lion revealed the several regulatory challenges
associated with trophy hunting in Zimbabwe.2 The key issue is whether
Zimbabwe should completely ban trophy hunting and save the wildlife
from torture and premature death? Or would such an outright ban
inure to the detriment of vulnerable wildlife by enabling unregulated
hunting that could lead to the extinction of the species?3
Furthermore, if sustainable trophy hunting is what is needed to
achieve the tripartite objectives of sustainability,4 how can strong and
effective policies, that protect wildlife, the local community, and the
ecosystem, be established and enforced? When Cecil the Lion roared
his last, was he the subject of legal sport-hunting that ended his life or
was he unlawfully lured into a field that snuffed his revered presence
from the Hwange National Park, after he had become the icon of
Zimbabwe’s wildlife tourism? The International Union for Conservation
of Nature’s (IUCN) briefing paper states, “while Cecil the Lion is perhaps
the most highly publicized controversial case, there are examples of
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5 International Union for Conservation of Nature, “Briefing Paper 2016:
Informing Decisions on Trophy Hunting” (2016) 1 <https://www.iucn.org/
sites/dev/files/iucn_sept_briefing_paper_-_informingdecisionstrophy
hunting.pdf> accessed 28 April 2018.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Victor K Muposhi, Edson Gandiwa, Paul Bartels, and Stanley M Makuza, “Trophy
Hunting, Conservation, and Rural Development in Zimbabwe: Issues, Options,
and Implications” (2016) International Journal of Biodiversity 1 .
9 Ibid (“The quota system used is based on ecological theory, i.e., maximum
sustainable yield (MSY), set in such a way that offtake levels are always below
the growth rate of the target species at any given time.”).
10 Zimbabwe Title XX Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975, Chapter 20:14 (Amended
1991) <https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/parks-and-wild-life-
act_html/Parks_And_Wild_Life_Act.pdf > accessed 29 April 2018 (noting in
the preamble that one of the purposes of the Act is “[t]o provide for the
establishment of national parks, botanical reserves, botanical gardens,
sanctuaries, safari areas and recreational parks …”).
11 Johannes Bauer and Alexander Herr, “Hunting and Fishing Tourism” in Karen
Higginbottom (ed), Wildlife Tourism: Impacts, Management & Planning,
Corporative Research Center for Sustainable Tourism (Common Ground Publishing
Pty Ltd 2004) 72.
weak governance, corruption, lack of transparency, excessive quotas,
illegal hunting, poor monitoring and other problems in a number of
countries.5 As reinforced in the IUCN briefing paper, the lack of effective
enforcements and accountability makes reform imperative.6
Trophy hunting is the hunting of animals with particular coveted
uniqueness and overlaps with the widely practised hunting for meat.7
Trophy hunting refers to hunting by tourists, who select specific
individual members of a species with extraordinary phenotypic traits
(e.g., large horns, tusks, or black mane) and they are accompanied by
a local professional hunter.8 Trophy hunting is part of wildlife tourism,
where the tourist-hunter kills a specific animal selected through a quota
system that chooses individual members of species to be legally
allocated for harvest during a year and in a particular area.9 There are
varied habitat areas for the wildlife to live in, which consists of a national
park, a safari, sanctuaries, botanical reserves, or gardens and recreational
parks.10
The challenge of managing trophy hunting is compounded by
community-based conservation programmes such as the Communal
Area Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE).11
CAMPFIRE was pioneered in Zimbabwe in the late 1980s and
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12 bid
13 Ibid 59. (“By using a Triple Bottom Line concept i.e. being socially, economically
and environmentally accountable hunting/fishing can contribute to a holistic
and sustainable conservation approach, as recent examples such as CAMPFIRE
demonstrates.”).
14 Josephine M Balzac, “Corporate Responsibility: Promoting Climate Justice
Through the Divestment of Fossil Fuels and Socially Responsible Investment” in
Randall S. Abate (ed), Climate Justice: Case Studies in Global And Regional
Governance Challenges (Environmental Law Institute, 2016) 126 (“Sustainable
development incorporates three elements: environmental protection, social
development, and economic development,” this triple bottom line concept of
maintaining the wildlife, the local community, and the environment parallels
with the sustainable development that informs the interdependency of each
element in order to be preserved for future generations.).
15 Brundtland Report 1987, Our Common Future: Report of the World Comm’n on
Env’t & Dev (1987), <http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf>
accessed 29 April 2018 (“Sustainable development is development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs.”).
16 International Fund for Animal Welfare, Exec Summary 2016: Killing for
Trophies: An Analysis of Global Trophy Hunting Trade 4.
17 Bauer and Herr (n 10) 59.
18 The Humane Society International; The Humane Society of the US, Exec
Summary 2016: Trophy Hunting by the Numbers: The US Role in Global Trophy
Hunting 1 (2016).
19 Ibid (The study indicated that “approximately 5,600 African lions, 4,600 African
elephants, 4,500 African leopards, 330 southern white rhinos and 17,200
African buffalo,” were imported into the United States.).
implemented by the Department of National Parks, which gave the
rural districts authority over their wildlife.12
Trophy hunting, which was originally meant to promote a set of
tripartite objectives, threatens to undermine all three goals.13 The
tripartite objectives, which include conserving wildlife, serving the local
community, and preserving the environment, are analogous to the
conventional triple bottom line14 in sustainable development.15
The counterintuitive effect of trophy hunting is apparent in that
wildlife is now endangered16 through questionable killings as in Cecil
the lion’s hunt; the communities where these species reside are
impoverished, and the ecosystems where these species reside have
been neglected.17 A study by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)
Law Enforcement Management Information System (LEMIS) that was
conducted to ascertain the impact of American trophy hunters in other
host countries between 2005 and 2014; revealed that more than 1,200
different kinds of animals were imported as trophies,18 and 32,500 of
those trophies were from the Africa’s Big Five Species.19
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20 Georgette Leah Burns, “The Host Community & Wildlife Tourism” in Karen
Higginbottom (ed), Wildlife Tourism: Impacts, Management and Planning
(Common Ground Publishing Pty Ltd, 2004) 126 (“CAMPFIRE aims for people
to continue farming whilst collecting profit from wildlife management.”).
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 IUCN (n 4) 2.
24 Peter G.H. Frost and Ivan Bond, “The CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe:
Payments for wildlife services” (2008) 65 Ecological Economics 776, 777
(“CAMPFIRE was developed around the concept of managing wildlife…”). (“By
2002, the CAMPFIRE Association represented 37 Rural District Councils,
covering over 244,000 km2 and supporting some 777,000 households, though
just 23 of these really functioned as intended.”)
25 Ibid.
26 Roxanne Julianne Kovacs, “What Makes a Failed State? Examining the case of
Zimbabwe” (E-International Relations, 31 May 2012) < http://www.e-ir.info/
2012/05/31/what-makes-a-failed-state-examining-the-case-of-zimbabwe/>
accessed 28 April 2018.
Trophy hunting was meant to be a resolution to the crisis of
poaching, which was mainly a result of the poverty in the communal
areas. It was meant to break the cycle of poverty sometimes that
emanated from droughts or wildlife destroying the fields’ crops, the
main source of food for the family. Its purpose was to enhance the
resources to keep the land productive for both human beings and
wildlife.20 The solution provided an innovative stream of income for
local communities and an incentive for them to protect wildlife.21 Money
from trophy hunting that infiltrates into the community provided relief
against poverty and created an incentive for the conservation of wild
life and other natural resources.22 Over the years, therefore, indigenous
and local communities worldwide have supported trophy hunting as a
strategy to leverage income generation, wildlife conservation and
sustainable livelihoods.23 This tripartite solution was enforced through
the grassroots initiative, CAMPFIRE.24
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
was responsible for funding this community-based natural resource
programme, which ensured community engagement in the protection
of its indigenous resources.25 The political climate transformed the
land ownership laws. The land grab from the commercial white farmers
changed the once-blossoming and champion of tourism and wildlife
management in Southern Africa to ruins.26 A country that once had an
admired comprehensive health system boasted a coveted 98.9 per cent
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27 Samantha Power, “How to kill a country: Turning a breadbasket into a basket
case in 10 easy steps – the Robert Mugabe Way” The Atlantic (December 2003)
<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/how-to-kill-a-
country/302845/> accessed 28 April 2018.
28 Kovacs (n 26).
29 Frost and Bond (n 23) 776. (CAMPFIRE was pioneered in Zimbabwe and has
been emulated in Africa.).
30 Ibid 776-77. (This was originally viewed as a menace destroying the livelihoods
of the community when wildlife went into the field and destroyed their crops
and sometimes killing their livestock.)
literacy rate and was a leading exporter of agricultural products today
lies on the brink of poverty.27 The lack of governance has thrown the
once-strong economy into a tailspin, which may be the reason why
Zimbabwe may not be able to sustain a complete ban of trophy hunting
as is the case in Botswana.28
Given the continued relevance of trophy hunting to economic
development in Zimbabwe, this article examines the legal framework
and tools for achieving sustainable trophy hunting in Zimbabwe. Section
2 provides a background on wildlife tourism’s sport – trophy hunting –
and how it was established to alleviate poaching and to benefit and
sustain the wildlife, the local community, and the ecosystem. Section
3 examines the governing international and domestic legal frameworks
on trophy hunting in Zimbabwe. These laws include the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES) and the local initiative CAMPFIRE.29 It considers CAMPFIRE’s
current dissonance, the neglect of the local community, and the
departure from its original vision to suppress poaching in order to give
back to the community, and enhance the value of the wildlife in the
community.30
Section 4 proposes solutions that are feasible for Zimbabwe, such
as amendments to CITES and CAMPFIRE’s legal frameworks to enhance
their effectiveness. It discusses how CITES can be amended to eliminate
exceptions in Appendix I listings, and to reduce allowances for the
remaining appendices, in order to effectively address trade in
endangered species. Moreover, it discusses an amendment to
CAMPFIRE to create a Finance Task Force that will include a strong
representation from the local community to foster transparency and
accountability. Furthermore, the community shall be able to exercise
their right to sue for compensation. The article concludes in section 5.
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31 GA Res 71/88, UN Doc A/RES/71/L88, UN Resolutions, Tackling illicit trafficking
in wildlife (Sept 5, 2017).
32 Ibid A/71/L 88 (The concept of protecting beyond the present but for the
future generation has been a recurring theme of sustainable development.).
33 IUCN (n 4) 5.
34 Victor K. Muposhi, Edson Gandiwa, Paul Bartels, Stanley M. Makuza & Tinaapi
H. Madiri, “Trophy Hunting and Sustainability: Temporal Dynamics in Trophy
Quality and Harvesting Patterns of Wild Herbivores in a Tropical Semi-Arid
Savanna Ecosystem” (2016) PLOS ONE 1.
35 IUCN (n 4) 5.
36 The Humane Society International (n 17) 1.
37 International Fund for Animal Welfare (n 15) 10. (SCI’s has a reward program
“. . . for example a hunter must kill an elephant, rhino, lion, leopard, and
African buffalo to get on the African Big Five Grand Slam list.”).
38 The Humane Society International, (n 17) 14. (“Just between 2010 and 2012,
100,000 African elephants were poached….”).
39 Ibid (The southern white rhino is listed as Near Threatened on the IUCN Red
List and Threatened under the ESA. Southern white rhino hunts can cost USD
$55,000-150,000.
2.  SUSTAINABLE TROPHY HUNTING
OR SUSTAINABILITY
On 5 September 2017, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
a resolution, “Tackling Illicit Trafficking in Wildlife, reinforcing the great
need for heightened sustainable wildlife management.”31 It reaffirmed
that “the intrinsic value of biological diversity and its various
contributions to sustainable development and human well-being …
are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth which
must be protected for this generation and the generations to come.”32
Sustainable trophy hunting should be good for conservation that is a
proponent’s banner; however, this has been undermined by the current
practices that mirror poaching.33 A reduction in trophy size of particular
and popular species may decrease the competitive advantage of the
destination. Thus the sustainability of trophy hunting as a conservation
tool is weakened.34 However, with effective policies and administration,
trophy hunting can have positive impacts.35
2.1 Harm to Wildlife
The contemplation of harm to wildlife in Zimbabwe focuses attention
on the threat to some of “the Big Five”. The Big Five36 consists of lion,
elephant, rhino, leopard, and the African buffalo, animals that are often
targeted for capture as trophies.37 Elephants38 and rhinos39 are killed
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40 Jena Hunt, “The Other Cecils: The Unnamed Victims of Poaching and Trophy
Hunting” (One Green Planet, 18 November 2015) <http://www.onegreen
planet.org/animalsandnature/unnamed-victims-of-poaching-and-trophy-
hunting/> accessed 28 April 2018.
41 Ibid.
42 IUCN Redlist, “Diceros bicornis” <http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/6557/
0> accessed 28 April 2018.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Hunt (n 40).
46 Andreas Wilson-Spath, “Problems with trophy hunting in Zimbabwe exposed”,
Conservation Action Trust, 22 November 2016 <https://conservationaction.
co.za/media-articles/problems-trophy-hunting-zimbabwe-exposed/> accessed
April 28 2018.
47 Muposhi and others , Trophy Hunting and Sustainability (n 34).
mainly for their precious ivory tusks. In an article that calls Cecil the
Lion’s death “murder,”40 the author laments that legal trophy hunting
is no longer different from poaching and states that “well over 100,000
elephants were killed in Africa since 2011; and as to Cecil’s brethren,
their numbers and their land are dwindling daily…”. The article
concludes that “whatever ‘conservation’ effort trophy hunters think
they are contributing to, it’s not working.”41
The black rhino is listed as critically endangered; its population
“has declined by an estimated 97.6 per cent since 1960 with numbers
bottoming out at 2,410 in 1995, mainly as a result of poaching.”42
Nonetheless, the black rhino population has been steadily increasing
at a continental level with numbers doubling to 4,880 by the end of
2010, yet the current numbers are still 90 per cent lower than they
were three generations ago.43 The black rhino has been listed on CITES
Appendix I since 1977, and international commercial trade in black
rhinos and their products has been prohibited.44 Trophy hunting critics
argue that “poaching has not been curtailed but bolstered,” and
emphasize that a trophy hunting operation may be a channel for
poaching.45 Additionally, as indicated by an indigenous spokesman,
“[t]rophy hunting in Zimbabwe’s Matetsi Safari Area is not sustainable
at current levels as trophy sizes are declining, there is little scientific
data supporting quota sizes, and hunting management is seriously
incapacitated.”46 Moreover, the trophy size and harvesting patterns in
these species pose a conservation and management dilemma on the
sustainability of trophy hunting in this area.47 The cruel irony is that
the principles of economics are at play. As a species becomes rarer, its
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48 David Hunter, James Salzman and Darwood Zaelke, International Environment
Law and Policy (3rd edn, New York : Foundation Press: Thomson/West,
University casebook series 2007) 1095 (“The demand for scarce wildlife
products such as elephant ivory, black rhinoceros horns, and tiger bones …have
driven many species to the brink of extinction.”).
49 Ibid.
50 USFWS, “Endangered Species Act Listing Protects Lions in Africa and India,
Director’s Order Strengthens Wildlife Import Restrictions for Violators of Wildlife
Laws” (Press Release, 21 December 2015) <https://www.fws.gov/news/
ShowNews.cfm?ref=endangered-species-act-listing-protects-lions-in-africa-
and-india-&_ID=35403> accessed 29 April 2018 (“In the wake of Cecil the
Lion’s death, “[a]s of January 22, 2016, the United States (U.S.) Federal Register
reflects a significant addition to the Endangered Species Act.”) (USFWS Press
Release).
51 Madison Clemens, “Cecil the Lion: The Everlasting Impact on the Conservation
& Protection of the King of the Jungle” (2017) 28 Vill Envtl LJ 51, 51-2, 70
(noting that twice the amount of lions existed in Africa until the 1950s.).
52 Ibid 55.
53 IUCN (n 4) 7.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
value increases, thereby increasing the incentive for further poaching.48
Furthermore, between 1981 and 1989, “elephant population was
reduced by half mainly due to trade in ivory.”49
In response to the dramatic decline of lion populations in the wild,
the USFWS announced in December 2015, five months after the
renowned death of Cecil the Lion, that it would list two lion subspecies
under the ESA.50 Fewer than 21,000 lions remain in Africa today.51 The
potential for loss of a top predator in its ecosystem, the king of the
jungle, hints at the potential ruinous outcome this extinction could
produce on the world.52
On the other hand, IUCN has reported that “while there is evidence
for a small number of populations that unsustainable trophy hunting
has contributed to local declines; it is not a significant threat to any of
these species and is typically a negligible or minor threat to African
wildlife populations.53 The report indicates that the principal causes of
the decline of wildlife such as the elephant, buffalo, white and black
rhino are habitat loss, competition with livestock, uncontrolled
poaching for meat and ivory, and retribution killing for human-wildlife
conflict instead of trophy hunting.54 Furthermore, the lion’s decline in
number is attributed to defence killing by humans to protect human
life and livestock; habitat loss; and the depletion of its prey base caused
by poaching.55 Conversely, critics attest that instead of trophy hunting
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56 Nels Paulson, “The Place of Hunters in Global Conservation Advocacy” (2012)
Conservation and Society 53, 61 (discussing the hunting-conservation paradox).
57 USWFS Press Release (n 50).
58 Ibid.
59 IUCN Redlist (n 42).
60 Ibid.
61 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora [CITES] E CoP17 Prop4 (2016), Seventeenth meeting of the Conference
of the Parties (CoP) Johannesburg (South Africa), Sep 24 – Oct 05, 2016,
<https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/prop/060216/E-CoP17-
Prop-04.pdf> accessed 28 April 2018 (CITES E CoP17).
62 Ibid.
63 Leslie Couvillion, “Habitat Loss, Agrobiodiversity, and Incidental Wildlife Loss”
in Gabriela Steier and Kiran K Patel (eds), International Farm Animal, Wildlife
and Food Safety Law (Springer 2017) 764.
conserving the wildlife and implementing a sustainable approach to
natural resources management, it has played a role in the decline of
wildlife.56
The USFWS states that, “[i]n the last 20 years, lion populations
have declined by 43 per cent due to habitat loss, loss of prey base, and
retaliatory killing of lions by a growing human population.57 This decline
is exacerbated by inadequate financial and other resources for countries
to effectively manage protected areas as the impact on lions in the
wild has been substantial.58
The IUCN’s 2015 Red List assessment of Panthera leo details serious
declines in lion populations across much of its African range.59 Lion
populations in West, Central, and East Africa are predicted to suffer a
further projected 50 per cent decline over the next two decades.60
Although the IUCN has maintained the lion’s “vulnerable” Red List
status, sample lion populations outside of Botswana, Namibia, South
Africa, Zimbabwe, and India have been observed to have declined by
more than 60 per cent from 1993-2014 and the lion, therefore, meets
the criteria for an endangered listing in the majority of its range.61 The
West African sub-population, which is perceived to just have over 400
individuals, is distinctly classified by the IUCN as “critically
endangered.”62
This widespread disregard for wildlife has created substantial
injustice for present and future generations through ecosystem
disruption. Indeed, there are genuine and controlled demands, where
wild plants and animals may be exchanged across borders to meet
demands for food, pets, medicines, where these goods are not native.63
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64 Sabrina Persaud, “Losing Our “CITES” on the “Traffic”: How Taxing Ivory
Trafficking Can Save the African Elephant from its Bloody Extinction” (2017)
20, Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, 295.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 CRS Report, Congressional Research Services, CRS Report, Zimbabwe: Current
Issues and US Policy, 23 (Sept 15 2016)
69 Dellinger (n 67) 407.
70 CRS Report Zimbabwe (n 69) 23.
71 CRS Report Zimbabwe (n 69) 23.
The ultimate lust has engulfed the African wildlife, and a black market
is the order of the day, which results in a black day for that elephant,
rhino, or lion. The widespread decline of these species has been enabled
by the loopholes in the current governing laws.
2.2 The Demand for Ivory
The insatiable demand of Southeast Asian ivory market, particularly
China and Vietnam, represents 40-70 per cent of the global ivory black
market.64 The elephant and the rhino are at the mercy of the ruthless
killers. Hence their population continues to decline, with only an
estimated 400,000 elephants remaining in Africa.65 Studies have shown
that between 2011 and 2014, poachers have killed 100,000 elephants
for their tusks, and it is estimated that an elephant is killed every
fifteen minutes for its tusks.66
Poachers are considered to be the greatest threat to the survival
of elephants. Consequently, rhinoceroses are at a point of extinction.67
Rhino horns are valued by Asian traditional medicine buyers and are a
key target of traffickers.68 Western black rhinoceroses are already
considered to have become extinct in 2011.69 The killing of Zimbabwe’s
elephants for their ivory tusks has also drawn global attention, as has
a spate of poaching-related, cyanide-based poisonings that reportedly
primarily targeted elephants and rhinos and affected multiple species.70
An estimated 400 or more elephants have reportedly been killed in
this manner since 2008, including about 70 in 2015 in Hwange and
other parks in Zimbabwe, along with several hundred rhinos in recent
years.71
The drastic disturbance of the wildlife and its ecosystem is
unprecedented, where smugglers have disguised poaching as legal
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72 Persaud (n 64). (“Tons of ivory have gone unnoticed at the ports because of
bribery.”).
73 CRS Report Zimbabwe (n 69) 23.
74 Ibid.
75 Dellinger (n 67) 407. (“Rhino horn was reported to be selling at higher value,
making it more expensive by weight than gold, diamonds or cocaine.”).
76 CRS Report Zimbabwe (n 69) 27.
77 Ibid (“Land seizures, state-centric economic policies, and persistent political
turmoil under Mugabe led to a severe economic contraction between 2000 and
2009 . . . .”).
78 ibid 14. (“Zimbabwe’s Central Bank has identified illicit financial flows worth
hundreds of millions of dollars annually-in the form of illicit cross-border bank
transfers, trade mispricing…, as a key economic challenge.”).
79 CRS Report Zimbabwe (n 69) 23.
trophy hunting and to the extent of using bribes.72 In 2015, the Minister
of Environment, Water and Climate, deployed the national army to
supplement game warden and police poaching patrol of activities in
several large game parks using helicopters, drones, and other methods.73
This became imperative after authorities arrested a group of game
wardens and some villagers near Hwange in connection to cyanide
poisoning where a poacher was killed and his accomplices arrested.74
Nevertheless, programmes, such as drone surveillance, DNA database
recordings, and even poisoning the horns to deter poaching have
achieved little success due to the high value placed by some on
rhinoceros horn, which is currently selling for a higher price per pound
than gold, diamonds, or cocaine.75
2.3 Socioeconomic Factors Are the Drivers of
the Harm
Political, social, cultural, and economic factors play an inextricable role
in determining the rate of success of any governing laws.76 Political
instability causes a domino effect that drives cultural tensions, social
disorder, and the collapse of an economy.77 The role of economic
instability78 in Zimbabwe has caused adverse consequences on a once-
celebrated and sustainable wildlife tourism and conservation
management system. While hunting is a significant source of
conservation income nationally, generating US$45 million in 2014
according to the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority,
it is controversial.79 The social and economic disorder inspires
desperation that prompts reliance on poaching, which adversely affects
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80 Southern African Development Community (SADC), Food, Agriculture and
Natural Resources (FANR) Directorate, “Natural Resources” <http://
www.sadc.int/themes/natural-resources/> accessed 28 April 2018.
81 Dellinger (n 67) 402.
82 Leader-Williams and others , “Trophy Hunting of Black Rhino Diceros Bicornis:
Proposals to Ensure Its Future Sustainability” (2005) 8 Journal of International
Wildlife Law and Policy 1, 3 (discussing the controversy behind trophy hunting
as a conservation tool).
83 Glen Martin, “Lionizing Cecil Makes Us Feel Good, But A Trophy Hunting Ban
Will Accelerate Slaughter” California Magazine (3 August 2015) <https://
alumni.berkeley.edu/california-magazine/just-in/2015-10-08/lionizing-cecil-
makes-us-feel-good-trophy-hunting-ban-will> accessed 16 November 2017.
84 The Humane Society International (n 17) 7.
85 Lindah Mhlanga, “Conflict between Wildlife and People in Kariba Town
Zimbabwe” (2001) 27 Michigan State University Africa-ejournals 39
(“Elephants and buffaloes damage and destroy property and frighten or kill
people … but there is no compensation for death, injury or property damaged
by animals.”).
86 CRS Report Zimbabwe (n 69) 25. (“Under the CBNRM model, community
groups often manage natural resource zones, and communities benefit from
resulting jobs, tourism proceeds, and limited, regulated hunting.”).
wildlife’s conservation and preservation of the environment.
Management of wildlife and enforcement of protection mandates are
critical to conservation efforts, as poverty, civil unrest, and other factors
can lead to illegal use and over-exploitation of these vulnerable
resources.80
Social status and cultural dimensions also shape the debate on
trophy hunting.81 The use of hunting opportunities as a conservation
tool, however, has led to differences of opinion over whether wildlife
should or should not be killed to promote conservation objectives.82
On the other hand, an indigenous observer in the developing world,
one with the first-hand experience of sharing the habitat space with
the wildlife, perceives trophy hunting as an amicable compromise.83
The local community may live in such proximity to the wildlife
that at times it may cause death to humans and destroy crops; this is
prevalent when the wildlife number increases to the extent that it is
competing for living space with the humans.84 In order to create
harmony and reduce the wildlife and human conflict,85 trophy hunting
has been the solution that not only brings resources to maintain the
natural resources and enhance conservation efforts but also enhances
the livelihood of the community.86
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IUCN highlights that the local community benefit from trophy
hunting, which support infrastructure, schools and health clinics, and
promote an increase in employment.87 Conversely, a closer look at
trophy hunting indicates that the industry employs only a few people88
and that the money from hunting fees that trickles down to needy
villagers is minimal.89 The critics of trophy hunting suggests that
corruption could be a factor that is comingled with governmental
operations such as allocating lucrative hunting areas to a specific class
of people outside the impoverished local community.90 Moreover, they
argue trophy hunting has not stopped poaching,91 particularly in
countries that have a poor record of wildlife conservation.92
3.  CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
ON TROPHY HUNTING
The governing framework on trophy hunting consists mainly of
international instruments, and their local implementation in Zimbabwe,
that aim to protect wildlife, safeguard the local community and the
preservation of the ecosystem.
3.1 The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES)
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES) Conference of the Parties (CoP) has expressly
acknowledged that commercial trade in wildlife may be beneficial to
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species conservation and to the host community.93 It has been shown
that illegal wildlife trade is estimated to earn from US$5 to US$40
billion annually.94 Further studies highlight that illegal trade in wildlife
is quite lucrative and ranks third in profitability after drugs and weapons
smuggling and is responsible for an estimated 40 per cent of species
facing extinction.95
CITES regulates the global trade in species that are threatened
with extinction.96 It is a treaty that seeks to ensure that trade in species
and specimens of wildlife and plants does not threaten their survival.97
CITES establishes a system of import and export regulations to prevent
the overexploitation of plants and animals listed in three appendices
to the Convention.98 It acts as a border security guard restricting the
flow of rare species and parts of species across national borders.99
Different levels of trade regulations are imposed depending on the
status of the listed species and the contribution trade makes to the
decline of species.100 Procedures are provided for periodic amendments
to the appendices.101
CITES was signed by 80 nations in Washington, D.C., on 3 March
1973 and it entered into force on 1 July 1975.102 CITES currently covers
183103 member states, including Zimbabwe, which joined by accession
on 5 May 1981, and the convention entered into force in Zimbabwe
on 17 August 1981.104 Zimbabwe’s implementation of trophy hunting
embraces CITES’ “sustainable use” paradigm, which argues that there
is a level of utilization of wildlife that is sustainable and results in
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substantial economic and other benefits.105 CITES employs the
“sustainable use”106 paradigm to regulate and control the effects of
trophy hunting. The purpose of this approach is to “to conserve
biodiversity and contribute to its sustainable use by ensuring that no
species of wild fauna or flora becomes or remains subject to
unsustainable exploitation through international trade, thereby
contributing to the significant reduction of the rate of biodiversity
loss.”107
CITES’ regulatory scheme consists of a three-tiered appendix listing
system that regulates trade in endangered species at different levels of
stringency depending on the appendix in which a particular species is
listed.108 These three appendices establish differing levels of permit
requirements for the import and export of endangered and threatened
species.109 There are over 35,000 plant and animal species that are
listed across the three appendices.110 The species may either be (a)
threatened, and protected under Appendix I; (b) at risk of becoming
threatened, and protected under Appendix II; or (c) protected in at
least one country, which has asked other Parties to control their trade,
and protected under Appendix III.111
Appendix I lists species threatened with extinction that are or may
be affected by trade.112 “Appendix I trade is limited to only scientific
and educational purposes and to some hunting trophies.”113 Whereas
Appendix I is viewed as the most restrictive of the three appendices,
its regulatory weakness is its allowance of trade even for threatened
species that are facing extinction.114 The “narrow exceptions” include
conducting trade only if both the exporting and importing countries
issue permits and consent to the international trade.115 This narrow
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exception has broad parameters and implementation measures that
may not be foreseeable dangers between developed countries. This
CITES provision, which leaves it up to the importing country’s
discretion as to whether its Scientific Authority must confirm the export
will not be detrimental to the species survival, and its Management
Authority to confirm the specimen will not be used for “primarily
commercial purposes,” is a dangerous loophole.116
For instance, a developing country that needs foreign currency to
sustain its economy may not consider the species’ interest and may
also enter into an agreement with a country that has a high demand
for ivory and may act against its Scientific Authority’s ruling to pursue
this trade at the expense of the species’ survival. The loophole does
not consider that trade among countries may be motivated by different
pressures and purposes; hence safeguarding the wildlife’s interest may
not be a priority.
Furthermore, permitting wealthy individuals to kill some of the
very last few specimens of rare species has been indicated as repugnant
to many members of the public that courts must consider these
contracts unenforceable for reasons of public policy.117 Indeed, the issue
becomes whether CITES, which is meant to safeguard the sustainability
of endangered species, is effectively implementing protective measures
through a ban that may be illusory. Yet, for many of those most
endangered species, CITES creates a type of dual system called an
incomplete ban.118 The increased decline in elephants, for instance,
may reflect CITES’ failure in its implementation, particularly in
permitting a reservation for Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa for
an Appendix I species.119
Appendix II includes species not necessarily now threatened with
extinction, but that may become so unless specimens of such species
are subject to strict regulation such that trade in the specimens of
other species is brought under effective control.120 Appendix II is by
far the largest appendix with over 32,000 listed species, including the
narwhal, American alligator, and polar bear.121 The African Elephant
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found in the savannah region and in Southern Africa, known by its
scientific name as Loxondota Africana, is currently listed in Appendix II
as a threatened species, where trade in hunting trophies for non-
commercial purpose is permitted.122 Trade in Appendix II species
requires the issuance of an export permit but not an import permit.123
Zimbabwe seeks to amend the present Appendix II listing of its
population of Loxodonta Africana by removing the annotation in order
to achieve an unqualified Appendix II listing.124 An annotation is “used
to qualify the permitted extent of trade in Appendix II species.”125 This
annotation specifies that certain specimens can be traded and “[a]ll
other specimens [which includes all raw elephant ivory] shall be
deemed to be specimens of species included in Appendix I and the
trade in them shall be regulated accordingly.”126 The annotation includes
a restriction in international trade of elephant parts (the ivory), as if it
were listed in Appendix I. The annotation applies to the elephant
population of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.127 In
the case of the African elephant populations of Botswana, Namibia,
South Africa, and Zimbabwe, a legally binding annotation to the
Appendix II listing deems elephant ivory from these populations as
being on Appendix I even though the populations are included in
Appendix II.128 Therefore, all commercial international trade in the
ivory of African elephants is currently prohibited under CITES.129
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Appendix III species are listed when a party currently protects the
species under its domestic laws and now seeks further cooperation of
CITES parties to control its international trade.130 Since this listing
includes species least threatened by trade,131 the party merely requires
trade cooperation of other parties to protect the species.132 There is no
need for the vote at the Conference of Parties, as is required for the
first two appendices,133 to list or amend the listing.134 The Management
Authority reviews that the exported specimen was not obtained in
breach of the State’s laws after an export license has been issued.135
CITES requires a Certificate of Origin for all trade in Appendix III species,
even if the transaction involves parties that have not listed species in
Appendix III.136
CITES’ successes have been asserted as its strong track record to
conserve wildlife. Its failures include its ineffective restrictions on
threatened species listed in Appendix I. Furthermore, its successes are
evident in Namibia and South Africa, where [s]ince the approval of
limited rhino hunting quotas by CITES in late 2004, their numbers
have increased by 67 per cent from 2,300 to 3,900.137
Like CITES, the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
recognizes the importance of conservation and sustainable use of
wildlife resources in Southern Africa.138 SADC expresses that “[w]ildlife
tourism is an increasingly important and growing industry that brings
benefits to private sector tourism businesses and local people alike.”139
Through capacity building and regional integration, SADC addresses
two key aspects of the United Nations Millennium Development
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Goals,140 namely, sustainable use of natural resources; and eradicating
poverty.141 Important natural resources include water, wildlife, and
minerals.142 To help protect these resources and foster regional
cooperation, protocols and initiatives such as the development
of Trans-frontier Conservation Areas (TFCA) have been spearheaded
by SADC.143 TFCAs are designed to collaboratively manage shared
natural and cultural resources across international boundaries for
improved biodiversity conservation and socioeconomic development,
which enhances and complements CITES vision.144
Like most other African countries, Zimbabwe inherited from its
colonial past a system of State ownership of wildlife that resulted in a
decline of wildlife outside of protected areas.145 The Parks and Wildlife
Act of 1975 (PAWA) provides private landholders in pre-independent
Zimbabwe the right to manage wildlife for their own benefit, and this
heralded an immediate reversal in wildlife declines on private land.146
The Act’s provisions and functions embrace advocacy for sustainable
wildlife management and reinforces the objectives set to be achieved
through CITES as well as SADC. However, under the current and
challenging Land Reform Programme, this number has changed and
wildlife conservation efforts have declined.
In 1982, the legal provisions of PAWA were extended to Rural
District Councils (RDCs) on behalf of rural communities in communal
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lands in whose areas viable populations of wildlife are found.147 It
enabled them to manage and benefit from wildlife resources through
the programme called Community Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources, popularly known as CAMPFIRE.148
3.2 Communal Areas Management Programme for
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE)
CAMPFIRE, a 1989 initiative, is a Zimbabwean community-based
natural resource management programme in which Rural District
Councils, on behalf of communities on communal land, are granted
the authority to market access to wildlife in their district to safari
operators.149 The safari operators then sell the hunting and photographic
safaris to international tourists, mostly sport hunters and eco-
tourists.150 This form of tourism has been instrumental in the
development of highly successful community conservation models such
as CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe.151 In 1995, nearly half of Zimbabwe’s fifty-
five districts (most of which still contained good numbers of wildlife)
had signed on to the programme, twelve of which were earning US$1.5
million in trophy fees, and an additional US$97,732 from tourism,
culling, and the removal of problem animals.152
From 1989-2001, CAMPFIRE generated over US$20 million of
revenue for the participating communities, 89 per cent of which came
from game hunting.153 The then-novel and innovative approach was
rooted in the “community conservation paradigm,”154 that today merely
exists on paper. CAMPFIRE seeks to ensure that communities continue
farming while collecting profit from wildlife management.155
Consumptive wildlife tourism in the form of hunting is encouraged in
the programme. Local villagers receive 70 per cent of the license fees
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that contribute to individual household and shared community needs
such as schools and health clinics.156
Species management projects, such as CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe,
have seen a degree of success in giving local people a real and tangible
interest in local conservation activities.157 Examples of CAMPFIRE
conservation activities include local game scout training and
employment, local wildlife censuses, environmental education,
poaching prevention activities, and species preservation, including
through flora preservation and transfers of wildlife between species-
rich and species-poor areas.158
According to a Safari Club International’s article, the CAMPFIRE
Program between 1989 and 2004 raised about US$30 million, which
was channelled back into the communities.159 Moreover, CAMPFIRE’s
impact on national income is at least US$10 million annually.160 If the
multiplier on tourism activities is included, CAMPFIRE is worth US$20-
25 million to Zimbabwe’s economic income each year.161 Periodic
contributions have also come from USAID, FAO, Safari Club
International Foundation, and the Kellogg Foundation.162
CAMPFIRE has been used as a model for similar programmes in
southern and eastern Africa.163 It upholds that “hunting is an important
conservation revenue source because trophy hunters often spend large
amounts on hunting trips, including on licensed local professional
guides, and on fees that generate revenues for communities.”164
CAMPFIRE also sees hunting as having a limited environmental impact,
given hunters’ low numbers and resource demands compared to higher
volume photographic and game viewing tourists, which typically require
infrastructure that is not available in more remote areas used by
hunters.165
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172 Burns (n 19) 135. (“Wildlife tourism may bring considerable foreign exchange
into a country … [i]t is rare, however, especially in less-developed countries,
CAMPFIRE was developed largely around the concept of managing
wildlife and its habitat in the communal lands of Zimbabwe for the
benefit of the people living in these areas.166 CAMPFIRE contributes to
job creation, empowerment, and diversification of livelihoods for rural
communities.167 Some communities benefit from infrastructure such
as clinics, schools, grinding mills, boreholes, and roads.168 Conversely,
another study revealed that although the CAMPFIRE concept has been
instrumental in creation of employment and infrastructure, the local
community considers that no significant changes have occurred to their
livelihoods.169
If the community benefits at all from CAMPFIRE, an average-sized
family only earns from US$1 to US$3 annually,170 hence the assessment
that the fire in the CAMPFIRE has run out. This is a disturbing reality,
considering CAMPFIRE’s vision of including the community in
conserving their ecosystem and receiving benefits from proper
management of their natural resources. Notably, the problem is
CAMPFIRE benefits few people at the top of the pyramid; the local
community is hardly benefiting from trophy hunting.171
A problem with CAMPFIRE is that decisions about resource
management are most frequently made outside the local
communities.172 CAMPFIRE was meant to create harmony among the
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local community, wildlife, and enhance the ecosystem as well as the
natural habitat that each needed to continue their existence.173
However, under the CAMPFIRE programme, said a local spokesman,
at least half of that revenue goes to the local communities for rural
development and environmental conservation.174 This ideal was upheld;
man can exist in harmony with wildlife and benefit from the
conservation efforts brought about by CAMPFIRE; hence, the respect
for trophy hunting was born. A local spokesperson states “[o]ur people
have stopped poaching, they understand that a buffalo is worth much
more if it is killed by a foreign hunter, an important principle to embrace
hence propagating the local, national, regional as well as the
international CITES’ vision.”175
Nevertheless, there is a strong recognition that the participatory
approach in wildlife conservation efforts is critical.176 In Zimbabwe, as
elsewhere in Southern Africa, wildlife protection and sustainable
environmental stewardship are widely pursued through community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM) programmes.177 The
United Nations General Assembly resolution on “tackling illicit
trafficking in wildlife” strongly encourages Member States to support
the livelihoods of rural communities through engaging with them.178
It reinforces the imperative of involving the local community as partners
who share their habitat with wildlife to participate in sustainable
conservation projects as this will leverage their livelihoods and secure
their rights to manage and benefit from wildlife.179
The core intent of CBNRM is to establish a socioeconomic stake in
wildlife and other natural resources for communities by tying local
livelihoods and economic incentives to sustainable resource
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management and environmental conservation efforts.180 However, today,
Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE is viewed differently, in light of the neglect of
the local community; the questionable and inequitable financial
distribution is the problem. This problem has taken the fire out of the
CAMPFIRE where each of the tripartite objectives is ignored.
4.  PROPOSALS FOR REGULATORY
REFORM IN ZIMBABWE
If trophy hunting were to become unviable, the thousands of rural
Zimbabwean households that directly benefit from CAMPFIRE would
be further alienated and neglected to an impoverished existence. They
would lose approximately US$1.7 per year, which has been decreased
due to the U.S. ban on imports of elephant’s parts.181 Therefore, instead
of completely banning trophy hunting, poor policies and practices could
be reformed through amendments. The legal framework should be
changed to promote the tripartite objectives, thus effectively
implementing wildlife conservation, conferring benefits to the local
community, and preserving the ecosystem. Reformation of the existing
legal frameworks should also be achieved by implementing stronger
sanctions, penalties, and strategies to alleviate further plundering
through poaching and improve the current implementation of CITES
and CAMPFIRE. These approaches will create teeth through
amendments and muscle through greater enforcement to achieve their
common objectives that safeguard the tripartite objectives.
Moreover, effective engagement with the local community will build
sustainable grassroots management. The support from responsible
national agencies182 to improve governance will also shape the success
of the tripartite objectives.183 Historically, unregulated hunting in some
continents led to the extinction of some wildlife.184 In recent times,
declines in wildlife populations have been associated with illegal
hunting, over harvesting, droughts, and fragmented and weak hunting
policies that regulate harvesting of wildlife species.185
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4.1 Proposed Amendments to International and Local
Frameworks
4.1.1 Reforming CITES to Address Unsustainable
Exemptions
Current exceptions in CITES undermine the effective implementation
of the Convention. Exceptions must be removed for Appendix I species
unless the species can no longer be regarded as threatened.
Furthermore, exceptions could be reasonably narrowed for the two
remaining appendices. A potentially larger loophole is the use of
reservations under Article XXIII, where countries have a right to opt
out of the Convention with respect to any specific listing,186 which is a
serious blunder in seeking a strong regulatory scheme in Appendix I.
Article XXIII should be subordinated by the power of Appendix I that
should change its listing only when the species is rendered no longer
threatened but safe and abundantly sustainable for present and future
generations.
Any reservation in relation to Appendix I may have serious and
devastating consequences. Such reservations mean that the States shall
be treated as a state and not a party to the treaty with respect to trade
in a particular species,187 which may result in the decline of the wildlife
that is already threatened. Article XXIII should only be used in limited
circumstances for Appendix II species, and for Appendix III, which is
usually based on a unilateral State’s request. This adjustment would
help CITES become a stronger and more effective conservation tool.
CITES’ recognition that implementation of some listings, especially
Appendix I listings, may adversely impact livelihoods of rural
communities when this affects their employment and basic necessities,
is commendable.188 However, this empathy must not justify the use
and trade of threatened species. The recognition that local communities
benefit from these species should be the very reason why they should
be protected rather than adopt a fickle standard that will devastate the
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communities even further when the species becomes extinct. Malleable
rules tend to be superficial and unfruitful to propel the desired vision.
It should be a non-negotiable rule that when a species is listed under
Appendix I, the species cannot be down-listed unless it is no longer
threatened or endangered.
America’s suspension of transportation of elephant parts from
Zimbabwe is an example of how wildlife may be protected when
domestic189 law of a foreign state prevails over international treaties
that are insufficient to safeguard the wildlife’s interests. In this case,
despite Zimbabwe’s submission of its report that its management of
the wildlife was sustainable and in accordance with Appendix II of
CITES, the U.S. was not convinced.190
The ban was initially justified by the USFWS’ finding that
Zimbabwean conservation plans did not adequately specify goals and
progress towards conserving elephant populations.191 USFWS
reinforced that the government had insufficient data with which to
assess the status of its elephant populations and lacked adequate
capacity to effectively implement and enforce elephant-related laws.192
The U.S. reasoned that although it facilitates imports of trophy hunting
parts through Appendix II of CITES, it also stated that it is conditioned
on Zimbabwe also satisfying standards that are set forth under the
ESA, which have not been met.193
In late 2015, after a review of scientific and commercial information,
USFWS also listed a subspecies of lion found in eastern and Southern
Africa, Panthera leo melanochaita, as threatened under the ESA.194
Moreover, a concurrent rule was enforced in 2016, that restricted
imports unless they complied with a strict and comprehensive process
to ensure that such imports are legally sourced, ESA-compliant, and
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196 Zimbabwe Sanctions Regulations, Rules and Regulations 80 Federal Register
42,373-42,705, (July 17, 2015). (The suspension on importation of trophies
taken during calendar year 2015 or future hunting seasons could be lifted if
additional information on the status and management of elephants in Zimbabwe
becomes available that satisfies the conditions of the 4(d) special rule under
the Endangered Species Act.).
197 CRS Report Zimbabwe (n 69) Summary.
198 The Humane Society International (n 17) 6. (“Any U.S.-based hunter will
require a USFWS permit to import lion trophies, which can only be issued if the
killing enhances the survival of wild lion populations, a standard few hunts are
likely to meet.”).
199 Ibid 27. (discusses how the killing of Cecil the Lion drew global attention,
condemnation, and calls for an end to lion hunting in Africa, and prompted
several airlines to stop transport of animal trophies.).
originate only from countries with well-managed, scientifically-based
lion species conservation programmes.195 This sends another message
that wildlife conservation must be achieved even if CITES lacks the
power when a stricter foreign domestic ESA compliance rule stands as
a stronger advocate for the wildlife’s interest.
America’s ban on transporting of elephant parts through its ESA
should be emulated by other countries, where the stricter rule prevails
to safeguard the wildlife’s interests.196 The U.S. has taken steps to
promote wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe, including by placing
temporary bans on the import of sport-hunted elephant trophies and
imposing permit requirements on lion imports.197 Consequently, the
ESA’s superseding of CITES required standards conveys that new
standards must be accomplished to stop states from risking endangered
or threatened species through importation of hunting trophies. In using
the Endangered Species Act (ESA),198 the U.S. has set a pathway for
other states to follow in suspending transportation of endangered
animal parts. The private industry’s response by airlines to stop
transportation of animal parts after Cecil the Lion’s death shapes the
movement towards sustainability.
Moreover, the private sector played an integral role in the aftermath
of Cecil the Lion, when the airlines’ response was stronger than CITES
after they banned transportation of endangered animals. They imposed
a transportation moratorium that prohibits transportation of trophy
animals and animal parts of endangered species from Zimbabwe, which
included the Big Five.199
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Despite the rhetoric that the airlines’ embargo has been a result of
the negative and emotive media framing of trophy hunting in Zimbabwe
following the controversial killing of Cecil the Lion,200 the airlines are
sending an important message about the importance of wildlife
conservation. The argument that this negative media framing and
imposition of embargos may render Zimbabwe a less attractive trophy
hunting destination and have negative socioeconomic results201 may
be outweighed by the ideal that wildlife possess the right to live.
Unsustainable use and exploitation of natural resources is prohibited.
It must not be justified to enhance economic pursuits, as this proves
dire not only to the wildlife but to local communities and future
generations when the ecosystem has been misused. The airlines’ ban
on transportation of endangered and threatened species’ parts deters
illicit trafficking of wildlife and thereby protects the wildlife.
Consequently, CITES must change its implementation methods to
incorporate new standards that do not allow for reservations, opting
out, and exceptions when the existing legal framework is no longer
effective to combat the decimation of wildlife.
4.1.2 CAMPFIRE: Reigniting the Fire that Ran out of
the Camp
CAMPFIRE needs to be revived; it needs to adopt an unprecedented
approach to manage the national and local funds that is integral to
effect a positive change for both animal and human welfare. In order
to set new standards of accountability and transparency, CAMPFIRE
should create a Finance Task Force. This Task Force will include a
significant representation of the local community not only made up of
Rural District personnel but ordinary residents. There should be a
rotational scheme for both professionals and locals, who will be able
to serve in the Committee for a two-year term. This approach would
prevent complacency that could potentially lead to corruption.
Furthermore, CAMPFIRE could be updated to allow the local
communities to exercise their rights to sue for compensation. Local
communities, under the amended CAMPFIRE, should be able to sue
the Parks and Wildlife Management Authority pursuant to PAWA, Part
II, Section (3);202 when they have suffered neglect, damage to property
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and self, or loss of enjoyment due to poaching and use of their habitat.
The loss of income and unrealized benefits should be considered and
accounted for in a reasonable and objective manner. The inequitable
system that allows a certain class to benefit and leave the poor local
community to suffer must be reformed.
4.1.3 The Need for Special Reporting and
Monitoring Standards
Special compliance and monitoring standards should be mainstreamed
into the process of issuing permits or licenses to hunt, training
professional hunters, and ensure the local community have been
educated on the programme. Biannual reporting on the progress of
adopting human rights based approach203 must be monitored, and data
on the decline or increase of a species population through scientific
findings must be reported. The pecuniary benefits must also be recorded,
tracked, and measured to ascertain how much is being allocated to
wildlife conservation, local community, and the ecosystem.
Requiring Environmental and Wildlife Contribution Certification
to tourist hunters by educating them about the community and the
impact of wildlife tourism will be part of the reform. Some individuals
wish to conserve species for future generations and are prepared to
pay for this effort.204 This represents an economic bequest value that
will contribute towards resources geared to wildlife conservation,
employing the local community to be anti-poaching rangers, and using
their education to increase their understanding of the values of
conservation.205 The certification may also include a tracking method
that creates a record for a trophy hunter, their origin, their
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organizational affiliation, and the type of animal a trophy hunter has
killed and wishes to hunt in the future.
This information will be useful to control excessive culling and
hunting of a particular species. It will provide data on hunting trends
that may be within the allocated quota or those that could possibly
open doors to excessive killings beyond what is permitted. A trophy
hunter that is always seeking to hunt an elephant may be stopped
when an index of animal quota is available to show other options to
prevent an endangered animal from being killed. The special compliance
rules should be presented to CITES, SADC, PAWA and CAMPFIRE and
must require that these reports be met via (i) Reporting the wildlife
population; (ii) Showcasing incidents of poaching; (iii) Showing the
reasonable precautionary steps available to combat poaching; and (iv)
Ensuring that the names and positions of the appropriate parties who
can be sued are clearly listed in order to be accountable for equitable
distribution of benefits.
Through greater enforcement of CITES, the implementation
through SADC’s TFCA, PAWA, and CAMPFIREs will be enhanced
through stronger sanctions. The reformed legal framework and the
hands-on approach may prevent endangered species from being included
in the allocated quota. Promoting photographic tourism for endangered
species, particularly for Appendix I listings, is of paramount importance
until such a time the wildlife numbers are sustainable. Appendices II
and III listings may be assigned for a specific season to avoid a year of
trophy hunting of a species. This approach to trophy hunting will
improve Zimbabwe’s wildlife management when trophy hunting is
controlled by effective governance.
4.1.4 Grassroots’ Inspection Sites and Engagement
with the Local Community
Even CITES has recognized in its recent resolution that that poor rural
communities may attach economic, social, cultural, and ceremonial
importance to some CITES-listed species.206 Moreover, the new
CAMPFIRE needs to be administered by putting this principle into
practice: local communities must participate and be engaged in the
process that affects their habitat and livelihoods. Additionally, the
implementation of CITES is better achieved with the engagement of
206 CITES and Livelihoods (n 189).
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rural communities, especially those that are traditionally dependent
on CITES-listed species for their livelihoods.207 The mandate for CITES
to work closely on the ground with CAMPFIRE is essential for effective
implementation of CITES listings, which may enhance livelihoods by
delivering long-term species conservation and reducing unsustainable
and illegal trade.208
Nevertheless, the recognition is a step towards understanding that
the conservation of wildlife is possible when the local community is
also involved in the initiatives to protect the wildlife from harm and
extinction. This reinforces that the tripartite objectives are protected
when laws recognize that they are not mutually exclusive but connected,
and the implementation of the programmes are dependent on the local
community. Furthermore, CITES recommends that parties adopt
mitigation strategies for human-wildlife conflict with respect to CITES-
listed species and that mitigation activities take into account not only
CITES-listed species but also the ecosystem that contains them.209
Broad import restrictions can adversely affect conservation efforts,
where “removing the incentives and revenue provided by hunting would
be likely to cause serious declines of populations of a number of
threatened or iconic species.”210 In order to collectively understand
the risks involved in implementing a ban and the risk associated with
continuing poor unregulated practices, the IUCN recommends the
imperative to acknowledge significant negative impacts on species
populations, habitat conservation, poaching levels, and the rights and
livelihoods of indigenous and local communities.211 This reinforcement
of the aforementioned proposals indicates that policy changes must
consider the impact on the tripartite objectives and recognize their
intertwined relationship. IUCN summons relevant decision-makers at
all levels to ensure that any decision that could restrict or end trophy
hunting programmes to be based first on careful and sound analysis
with understanding of its role in conservation and the livelihoods of
the local communities.212 There has also been lack of transparency in
financial distribution from the trophy hunting’s pecuniary benefits to
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
209 CITES and Livelihoods (n 189).
210 IUCN (n 4) 8.
211 Ibid 1.
212 Ibid.
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the indigenous and local communities. This lack of accountability could
be attributed to the absence of representation from the local community.
Lastly, IUCN’s proposal cements the recurring theme in regulating
sustainable trophy hunting that decisions ought to be made without
decimating the indigenous and local community rights and livelihoods
rendering equitable incentives to achieve enduring conservation
efforts.213
4.1.5 Zimbabwe Cannot Afford a Complete Ban
Comparative study will highlight how Zimbabwe differs politically and
economically from Botswana; hence the former cannot afford a complete
ban but could implement reformed and restrictive regulations. Botswana
banned trophy hunting and, after CoP17’s rejection to uplist Loxodonta
Africana for Southern African countries, it unilaterally requested that
its elephant population should be listed under Appendix I. Zimbabwe’s
push for an open market that allows legal commercial trading in ivory
is based on its belief that the ivory ban has been a failure, because the
black market exists and is being fed through poaching. Therefore
restriction on ivory trade has not helped to conserve wildlife but has
been part of the problem.214 Improved enforcement mechanisms are
recommended to propagate meaningful wildlife tourism management
that benefit the host community and enhances conservation efforts of
the environment and biodiversity.
Zimbabwe cannot afford to implement a complete ban on trophy
hunting due to its vulnerable socioeconomic status that is unlike
Botswana’s economic stability. The Department of the National Parks
must work jointly with other departments to alleviate corruption in
interrelated departments such as Tourism and Transportation. It must
apply its own administrative rulings that are insulated from external
influences. It also must implement a Trophy Hunting Task Force that
will bring accountability and transparency and enhance local
employment and engagement to eradicate poverty. The joint
collaboration with Non-Governmental Organizations that are partners
with United Nations and seek to achieve Millennium Development
213 Ibid.
214 CITES Zimbabwe’s Proposal (n 126) 2. (“There have been only two “one-off
sales” (1999 and 2008)1 and the Appendix II countries realized only a fraction
of the value of their ivory at these sales.”).
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Goals should be helpful to garner resources towards sustainable results.
The regulatory weakness in legal trophy hunting as highlighted
after Cecil the Lion’s death can be reversed through reformation. The
weaknesses include not keeping to the allocated quotas, hunting in
the wrong locations, taking unauthorized species, misusing trophies
to feed the illegal commercial market, and the growth of organized
crime.215 Nonetheless, tourism and hunting can be complementary land
uses in many areas when effective policies build a comprehensive
sustainable wildlife management and viable land use.216 Effective new
rules for customs, investigatory alliance among the Tourism,
Transportation, and Department of National Parks and Wildlife
Management should be working towards an anti-corruption system
through a joint network.
In Zimbabwe, however, the trade-offs are quite high. In contrast to
the stable political and socioeconomic status in Botswana, Zimbabwe’s
current economy cannot sustain a complete ban. It could be fatal for
the wildlife, the local communities, and the ecosystem.217 Nevertheless,
Botswana has encouraged wildlife photographic tourism that can still
produce some income for the locals, whereas many African countries
steadfastly support trophy hunting, including Zambia which is
reinstating trophy hunting after a periodic suspension.218 A ban on
trophy hunting will further cripple its economy and undermine the
tripartite objectives. There have been, and continue to be, cases of
poorly conducted and poorly regulated hunting.219 However, well-
regulated trophy hunting programmes play an integral role in delivering
benefits for both wildlife conservation and for the livelihoods and well-
being of local communities living with wildlife.220 A blanket ban on
215 IUCN (n 4) 5.
216 Ibid 2.
217 Norimitsu Onishi, “A Hunting Ban Saps a Village’s Livelihood” New York Times
(12 September 2015) <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/world/a-
hunting-ban-saps-a-villages-livelihood.html> accessed 29 April 2018 (“The
hunting ban has also meant a precipitous drop in income. Over the years,
villagers had used money from trophy hunters, mostly Americans, to install
toilets and water pipes, build houses for the poorest, and give scholarships to
the young and pensions to the old.”).
218 Ibid.
219 IUCN (n 4) 1.
220 Ibid (IUCN urges a push for urgent reform in trophy hunting, citing that there
have been recorded incidents where trophy hunting has contributed to the
decline of species.).
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trophy hunting would penalize good as well as bad practices. Such an
overly broad rule would undermine these conservation and livelihood
benefits.
5.  CONCLUSION
The paradigm of sustainable trophy hunting or wildlife tourism is
hypocritical and wrong in the minds of animal conservationists in many
developed countries. Nevertheless, there is a growing recognition that
balance is required in an approach to sustain wildlife, human
communities, and the ecosystem. The tripartite objectives can be
achieved by not adopting a mutually exclusive approach because each
element needs others to maintain a sustainable natural cycle, which
defines all life to be interdependent. The atrocious killing of wildlife
disrupts the ecosystem.
In developing countries, as in Southern Africa, wildlife and the
local community co-exist in close proximity, especially in rural areas.
CITES needs to adopt amendments with teeth to enforce its laws, with
more bite, and penalize lapses that enhance poaching. SADC’S shared
resources approach, through its TFCA framework should be protected
and be immune to changes of law or ban in trophy hunting as is the
case with Botswana since strong regional alliances must be promoted
to uphold the tripartite objectives. Once a success story, CAMPFIRE
could be reignited through new standards, effective engagement, and
involvement of each regulatory framework as it works in unison to
enhance wildlife conservation and pass through benefits to the local
community. The existing framework in Zimbabwe has failed to protect
the lion from unlawful hunts – the elephant is prone to being poisoned,
and the rhino is left to rot after bleeding to death. Nonetheless, a
complete ban will further cripple the wildlife conservation efforts,
diminish eradication of poverty for the local community, and alienate
environmental preservation initiatives, which will devastate the
tripartite objectives.
